Despite the increasing interest in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in the community, understanding its theoretical foundation has long been recognized as a challenging problem. In this work, we make an attempt towards addressing this problem, by providing finite-sample analyses for fully decentralized MARL. Specifically, we consider two fully decentralized MARL settings, where teams of agents are connected by time-varying communication networks, and either collaborate or compete in a zero-sum game, without the absence of any central controller. These settings cover many conventional MARL settings in the literature. For both settings, we develop batch MARL algorithms that can be implemented in a fully decentralized fashion, and quantify the finite-sample errors of the estimated action-value functions. Our error analyses characterize how the function class, the number of samples within each iteration, and the number of iterations determine the statistical accuracy of the proposed algorithms. Our results, compared to the finite-sample bounds for single-agent RL, identify the involvement of additional error terms caused by decentralized computation, which is inherent in our decentralized MARL setting. To our knowledge, our work appears to be the first finite-sample analyses for MARL, which sheds light on understanding both the sample and computational efficiency of MARL algorithms. 1 collaborative MARL is usually modeled as either a multi-agent Markov decision process (MDP) [8] , or a team Markov game [9] , where the agents are assumed to share a common reward function. A more general while challenging setting for collaborative MARL considers heterogeneous reward functions for different agents, while the collective goal is to maximize the average of the long-term return among all agents [10, 5] . This setting makes it nontrivial to design fully decentralized MARL algorithms, in which agents make globally optimal decisions using only local information, without the coordination of any central controller. The fully decentralized protocol is favored over a centralized one, due to its better scalability, privacy-preserving property, and computational efficiency [10, 5, 11] . Such a protocol has been broadly advocated in practical multi-agent systems, including unmanned (aerial) vehicles [12, 13] , smart power grid [14, 15] , and robotics [16] . Several preliminary attempts have been made towards the development of MARL algorithms in this setting [10, 5] , with theoretical guarantees for convergence. However, these theoretical guarantees are essentially asymptotic results, i.e., the algorithms are shown to converge as the number of iterations increases to infinity. No analysis has been conducted to quantify the performance of these algorithms with a finite number of iterations/samples.
Introduction
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has received increasing attention in the reinforcement learning community, with recent advances in both empirical [1, 2, 3] and theoretical studies [4, 5, 6] . With various models of multi-agent systems, MARL has been applied to a wide range of domains, including distributed control, telecommunications, and economics. See [7] for a comprehensive survey on MARL.
Various settings exist in the literature on multi-agent RL, which are mainly categorized into three types: the collaborative setting, the competitive setting, and a mix of the two. In particular, collaborative and competitive agents [1, 39, 2] , but with focus on empirical instead of theoretical studies. Besides, [40] also considered multi-agent learning with sample complexity analysis under the framework of repeated matrix games.
To lay theoretical foundations for RL, an increasing attention has been paid to finite-sample, namely, non-asymptotic analyses, of the algorithms. One line of work studies the sample complexity of RL algorithms under the framework of PAC-MDP [26, 27, 28] , focusing on the efficient exploration of the algorithms. Another more relevant line of work investigated the finite-sample performance of batch RL algorithms, based on the tool of approximate dynamic programming for analysis. [29] studied a finite-sample bounds for the fitted-value iteration algorithm, followed by [31, 30] on fitted-policy iteration and continuous action fitted-Q iteration. Similar ideas and techniques were also explored in [41, 42, 33] , for modified policy iteration, nonparametric function spaces, and deep neural networks, respectively. Besides, for online RL algorithms, [43, 44] recently carried out the finite-sample analyses for temporal difference learning algorithms. None of these existing finite-sample analyses, however, concerns multi-agent RL. The most relevant analyses for batch MARL were provided by [19, 4] , focusing on the error propagation of the algorithm using also the tool of approximate dynamic programming. However, no statistical rate was provided in the error analysis, nor the computational complexity that solves the fitting problem at each iteration. We note that the latter becomes inevitable in our fully decentralized setting, since the computation procedure explicitly shows up in our design of fully decentralized MARL algorithms. This was not touched upon in the single-agent analyses [31, 30, 41] , since they assume the exact solution to the fitting problem at each iteration can be obtained.
In addition, in the regime of fully decentralized decision-making, decentralized partially-observable MDP (Dec-POMDP) [45] is recognized as the most general and powerful model. Accordingly, some finite-sample analysis based on PAC analysis has been established in the literature [46, 47, 48] . However, since Dec-POMDPs are known to be NEXP-complete and thus difficult to solve in general, these Dec-POMDP solvers are built upon some or all the following requirements: i) a centralized planning procedure to optimize the policies for all the agents [46] ; ii) the availability of the model or the simulator for the sampling [46, 47] , or not completely model-free [48] ; iii) a special structure of the reward [46] , or the policy-learning process [47] . Also, these PAC results only apply to the smallscale setting with tabular state-actions and mostly finite time horizons. In contrast, our analysis is amenable to the batch RL algorithms that utilize function approximation for the setting with large state-action spaces.
Notation. For a measurable space with domain S , we denote the set of measurable functions on S that are bounded by V in absolute value by F (S , V ). Let P (S ) be the set of all probability measures over S . For any ν ∈ P (S ) and any measurable function f : S → R, we denote by f ν,p the ℓ p -norm of f with respect to measure ν for p ≥ 1. For simplicity, we write f ν for f 2,ν . In addition, we define f ∞ = max s∈S |f (s)|. We use 1 to denote the column vector of proper dimensions that has all elements equal to 1. We use a ∨ b to denote max{a, b} for any a, b ∈ R, and define the set [K] = {1, 2, · · · , K}.
Problem Formulation
In this section, we introduce the formal formulation of our fully decentralized MARL problem. We first present the formulation of the fully decentralized MARL problem in a collaborative setting. Then, we lay out the competitive setting where two teams of collaborative agents form a zero-sum Markov game.
Fully Decentralized Collaborative MARL
Consider a team of N agents, denoted by N = [N ] , that operate in a common environment in a collaborative fashion. In the fully decentralized setting, there exists no central controller that is able to either collect rewards or make the decisions for the agents. Alternatively, to foster the collaboration, agents are assumed to be able to exchange information via a possibly time-varying communication network. We denote the communication network by a graph G τ = (N , E τ ), where the edge set E τ represents the set of communication links at time τ ∈ N. Formally, we define the following model of networked multi-agent MDP (M-MDP).
Definition 2.1 (Networked Multi-Agent MDP). A networked multi-agent MDP is characterized by a
where S is the global state space shared by all the agents in N , and A i is the set of actions that agent i can choose from. Then, let A = N i=1 A i denote the joint action space of all agents. Moreover, P : S × A → P (S ) is the probability distribution of the next state, R i : S × A → P (R) is the distribution of local reward function of agent i, which both depend on the joint actions a and the global state s. γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. S is a compact subset of R d which can be infinite, A has finite cardinality A = |A|, and the rewards have absolute values uniformly bounded by R max . At time t, the agents are connected by the communication network G t . The states and the joint actions are globally observable while the rewards are observed only locally.
By this definition, agents observe the global state s t and perform joint actions a t = (a 1 t , . . . , a N t ) ∈ A at time t. In consequence, each agent i receives an instantaneous reward r i t that samples from the distribution R i (· | s t , a t ). Moreover, the environment evolves to a new state s t+1 according to the transition probability P(· | s t , a t ). We refer to this model as a fully decentralized one because each agent makes individual decisions based on the local information acquired from the network. In particular, we assume that given the current state, each agent i chooses actions independently to each other, following its own policy π i : S → P (A i ). Thus, the joint policy of all agents, denoted by π : S → P (A), satisfies π(a | s) = i∈N π i (a i | s) for any s ∈ S and a ∈ A.
The collaborative goal of the agents is to maximize the global average of the cumulative discounted reward obtained by all agents over the network, which can be formally written as
Accordingly, under any joint policy π, the action-value function Q π : S × A → R can be defined as Q π (s, a) = 1 N i∈N E a t ∼π(· | s t ) ∞ t=0 γ t · r i t s 0 = s, a 0 = a .
Notice that since r i t ∈ [−R max , R max ] for any i ∈ N and t ≥ 0, Q π are bounded by R max /(1 − γ ) in absolute value for any policy π. We let Q max = R max /(1 − γ ) for notational convenience. Thus we have Q π ∈ F (S × A, Q max ) for any π. We refer to Q π as global Q-function hereafter. For notational convenience, under joint policy π, we define the operator P π : F (S × A, Q max ) → F (S × A, Q max ) and the Bellman operator T π : F (S × A, Q max ) → F (S × A, Q max ) that correspond to the globally averaged reward as follows
where r(s, a) = i∈N r i (s, a) · N −1 denotes the globally averaged reward with r i (s, a) = rR i (dr | s, a).
Note that the action-value function Q π is the unique fixed point of T π . Similarly, we also define the optimal Bellman operator corresponding to the averaged reward r as
.
In addition, for any action-value function Q : S × A → R, one can define the one-step greedy policy π Q to be the deterministic policy that chooses the action with the largest Q-value, i.e., for any s ∈ S , it holds that
If there are more than one actions a ′ that maximize the Q(s, a ′ ), we break the tie randomly. Furthermore, we can define an operator G, which generates the average greedy policy of a vector of Q-function, i.e., G(Q) = N −1 i∈N π Q i , where π Q i denotes the greedy policy with respect to Q i .
Fully Decentralized Two-Team Competitive MARL
Now, we extend the fully decentralized collaborative MARL model to a competitive setting. In particular, we consider two teams, referred to as Team 1 and Team 2 that operate in a common environment. Let N and M be the set of agents in Team 1 and Team 2, respectively, with |N | = N and |M| = M. We assume the two teams form a zero-sum Markov game, i.e., the instantaneous rewards of all agents sum up to zero. Moreover, within each team, the agents can exchange information via a communication network, and collaborate in a fully decentralized fashion as defined in §2.1. We give a formal definition for such a model of networked zero-sum Markov game as follows.
where S is the global state space shared by all the agents in N and M, A i (resp. B i ) are the sets of actions for any agent i ∈ N (resp. j ∈ M). Then, let A = i∈N A i (resp. B = j∈M B j ) denote the joint action space of all agents in Team 1 (resp. in Team 2). Moreover, P : S × A × B → P (S ) is the probability distribution of the next state, R 1,i , R 2,j : S × A × B → P (R) are the distribution of local reward function of agent i ∈ N and j ∈ M, respectively. γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Also, the two teams form a zero-sum Markov game, i.e., at time t, it follows that i∈N r 1,i t + j∈M r 2,j
Moreover, S is a compact subset of R d , both A and B have finite cardinality A = |A| and B = |B|, and the rewards have absolute values uniformly bounded by R max . All the agents in Team 1 (resp. in Team 2), are connected by the communication network G 1 t (resp. G 2 t ) at time t. The states and the joint actions are globally observable while the rewards are observed only locally to each agent.
We note that this model generalizes the most common competitive MARL setting, which is usually modeled as a two-player zero-sum Markov game [17, 19] . Additionally, we allow collaboration among agents within the same team, which establishes a mixed MARL setting with both competitive and collaborative agents. This mixed setting finds broad practical applications, including team-battle video games [21] , robot soccer games [22] , and security for cyber-physical systems [23] .
For two-team competitive MARL, both teams now aim to find the minimax joint policy that maximize the average of the cumulative rewards over all agents in its team. With the zero-sum assumption, this goal can also be viewed as one team, e.g., Team 1, maximizes the globally averaged return of the agents it contains; while Team 2 minimizes that globally averaged return. Accordingly, we refer to Team 1 (resp. Team 2) as the maximizer (resp. minimizer) team, without loss of generality. Let π i : S → P (A i ) and σ j : S → P (B j ) be the local policy of agent i ∈ N and j ∈ M, respectively. Then, given any fixed joint policies π = i∈N π i of Team 1 and σ = j∈M π j of Team 2, one can similarly define the action-value function Q π,σ : S × A × B → R as
for any (s, a, b) ∈ S × A × B, and define the value function V π,σ : S → R by
Note that Q π,σ and V π,σ are both bounded by Q max = R max /(1 − γ ) in absolute values, i.e., Q π,σ ∈ F (S × A × B, Q max ) and V π,σ ∈ F (S , Q max ). Formally, the collective goal of Team 1 is to find the optimal π such that max π min σ V π,σ . The collective goal of Team 2 is thus to solve min σ max π V π,σ . By Minimax theorem [49, 50] , there exists some minimax value V * ∈ F (S , Q max ) of the game such that
Similarly, one can define the minimax Q-value of the game as Q * = max π min σ Q π,σ = min σ max π Q π,σ . We also define the optimal Q-value of Team 1 under policy π as Q π = min σ Q π,σ , where the opponent Team 2 is assumed to performing the best response to π. Moreover, under fixed joint policy (π, σ) of two teams, one can define the operators P π,σ , P * :
where r 1 (s, a, b) = N −1 · i∈N r 1,i (s, a, b) denotes the globally averaged reward of Team 1, where we write r 1,i (s, a, b) = rR 1,i (dr | s, a, b). Note that the operators P π,σ , P * , T π,µ , and T are all defined corresponding to the globally averaged reward of Team 1, i.e., r 1 . One can also define all the quantities above based on that of Team 2, i.e., r 2 = j∈M r 2,j (s, a) · M −1 , with the max and min operators exchanged. Also note that the solution to the maxmin problem on the right-hand side of (2.3), which is essentially solving a matrix game given Q(s ′ , ·, ·), may only have mixed strategies. For notational brevity, we also define the following two operators T π as T π Q = min σ T π,σ Q, for any Q ∈ F (S × A × B, Q max ). Moreover, with a slight abuse of notation, we also define the average Bellman operator T : [F (S ×A×B, Q max )] N → F (S ×A×B, Q max ) for the maximizer team, i.e., Team 1, similar to the definition in (2.2) 1 :
In addition, in zero-sum Markov game, one can also define the greedy policy or equilibrium policy of one team with respect to a value or action-value function, where the policy acts optimally based on the best response of the opponent team. Specifically, given any Q ∈ F (S × A × B, Q max ), the equilibrium joint policy of Teams 1, denoted by π Q , is defined as
5)
With this definition, we can define an operator E 1 that generates the average equilibrium policy with respect to a vector of Q-function for agents in Team 1. Specifically, with Q = [Q i ] i∈N , we define E 1 (Q) = N −1 · i∈N π Q i , where π Q i is the equilibrium policy as defined in (2.5).
Algorithms
In this section, we introduce the fully decentralized MARL algorithms proposed for both the collaborative and the competitive settings.
Fully Decentralized Collaborative MARL
Our fully decentralized MARL algorithm is established upon the fitted-Q iteration algorithm for single-agent RL [51] . In particular, all agents in a team have access to a dataset D = {(s t , {a i t } i∈N , s t+1 )} t=1,··· ,T that records the transition of the multi-agent system along the trajectory under a fixed joint behavior policy. The local reward function, however, is only available to each agent itself.
At iteration k, each agent i maintains an estimate of the globally averaged Q-function denoted by Q i k . Then, agent i samples local reward {r i t } t=1,··· ,T along the trajectory D, and calculates the local target data
With the local data available, all agents hope to collaboratively find a common estimate of the global Q-function, by solving the following least-squares fitting problem
where H ⊆ F (S ×A, Q max ) denotes the function class used for Q-function approximation. The exact solution, denoted by Q k+1 , to (3.1) can be viewed as an improved estimate of the global Q-function, which can be used to generate the targets for the next iteration k + 1. However, in practice, since agents have to solve (3.1) in a distributed fashion, then with a finite number of iterations of any distributed optimization algorithms, the estimate at each agent may not reach exact consensual. Instead, each agent i may have an estimate Q i k+1 that is different from the exact solution Q k+1 . This mismatch will then propagate to next iteration since agents can only use the local Q i k+1 to generate the target for iteration k + 1. This is in fact one of the departures of our finite-sample analyses for MARL from the analyses for the single-agent setting [29, 52] . After K iterations, each agent i finds the local greedy policy with respect to Q i K and the local estimate of the global Q-function. To obtain a consistent joint greedy policy, all agents output the average of their local greedy policies, i.e., output π K = G( Q K ). The proposed fully decentralized algorithm for collaborative MARL is summarized in Algorithm 1.
When a parametric function class is considered, we denote H by H Θ , where H Θ = {f (·, ·; θ) ∈ F (S × A, Q max ) : θ ∈ Θ} and Θ ⊆ R d is a compact set of the parameter θ. In this case, (3.1) becomes a vector-valued optimization problem with a separable objective among agents. For notational convenience, we denote g i (θ) = T −1 · T t=1 Y i t − f (s t , a t ; θ) 2 , then (3.1) can be written as
Since target data are distributed, i.e., each agent i only has access to its own g i (θ), the agents need to exchange local information over the network G t to solve (3.2), which admits a fully decentralized optimization algorithm. Note that problem (3.2) may be nonconvex with respect to θ when H Θ is a nonlinear function class, e.g., deep neural networks, which makes the exact minimum of (3.2) intractable. In addition, even if H Θ is a linear function class, which turns (3.2) into a convex problem, with only a finite number of steps in practical implementation, decentralized optimization algorithms can at best converge to a neighborhood of the global minimizer. Thus, the mismatch between Q i k and Q k mentioned above is inevitable for our finite iteration analyses. There exists a rich family of decentralized or consensus optimization algorithms for networked agents that can solve the vector-valued optimization problem (3.2). Since we consider a more general setting with a time-varying communication network, several recent work [53, 54, 55, 56] may apply. When the overall objective function is strongly-convex, [54] is the most advanced algorithm that is guaranteed to achieve geometric/linear convergence rate to the best of our knowledge. Thus, we use the DIGing algorithm proposed in [54] as an example to solve (3.2). In particular, each agent i maintains two vectors in DIGing, i.e., the solution estimate θ i l ∈ R d , and the average gradient estimate γ i l ∈ R d , at iteration l. Each agent exchanges these two vectors to the neighbors over the time-varying network {G l } l≥0 , weighted by some consensus matrix C l = [c l (i, j)] N ×N that respects the topology of the graph G l 2 . Details on choosing the consensus matrix C l will be provided in §4. The updates of the DIGing algorithm are summarized in Algorithm 2. If H Θ represents a linear function class, then (3.2) can be strongly-convex under mild conditions. In this case, one can quantitatively characterize the mismatch between the global minimizer of (3.2) and the output of Algorithm 2 after a finite number of iterations, thanks to the linear convergence rate of the algorithm.
For general nonlinear function class H Θ , the algorithms for nonconvex decentralized optimization [53, 57, 55] can be applied. Nonetheless, the mismatch between the algorithm output and the global minimizer is very difficult to quantify, which is a fundamental issue in general nonconvex optimization problems.
Fully Decentralized Two-team Competitive MARL
The proposed algorithm for two-team competitive MARL is also based on the fitted-Q iteration algorithm. Similarly, agents in both teams receive their rewards following the single trajectory 
To avoid repetition, in the sequel, we focus on the update and analysis for agents in Team 1.
At iteration k, each agent i ∈ N in Team 1 maintains an estimate Q 1,i k of the globally averaged Q-function of its team. With the local reward
. Then, all agents in Team 1 aim to improve the estimate of the minimax global Q-function by collaboratively solving the following least-squares fitting problem
Here with a slight abuse of notation, we also use H ⊂ F (S ×A×B, Q max ) to denote the function class for Q-function approximation. Similar to the discussion in §3.1, with fully decentralized algorithms that solve (3.3), agents in Team 1 may not reach consensus on the estimate within a finite number of iterations. Thus, the output of the algorithm at iteration k is a vector of Q-functions, i.e., Q 1 k = [Q 1,i k ] i∈N , which will be used to compute the target at the next iteration k +1. Thus, the final output of the algorithm after K iterations is the average greedy policy with respect to the vector Q 1 K , i.e., E 1 (Q 1 K ), which can differ from the exact minimizer of (3.3) Q 1 k . The fully decentralized algorithm for competitive two-team MARL is summarized in Algorithm 3. Moreover, if the function class H is parameterized as H Θ , especially as a linear function class, then the mismatch between Q 1,i k and Q 1 k after a finite number of iterations of the distributed optimization algorithms, e.g., Algorithm 2, can be quantified. We provide a detailed discussion on this in §4.3.
Algorithm 3 Fully Decentralized Fitted Q-Iteration Algorithm for Two-team Competitive MARL
Input: Function class H, trajectory data D = s t , {a i t } i∈N , {b j t } j∈M , s t+1 t=1,··· ,T , number of itera- tions K, number of samples n, the initial estimator vectors Q 1 0 = [ Q 1,i 0 ] i∈N . for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , K − 1 do for agent i ∈ N in Team 1 do Solve a matrix game max π ′ ∈P (A) min σ ′ ∈P (B) E π ′ ,σ ′ Q 1,i k (s t+1 , a, b) to obtain equilibrium policies (π ′ k , σ ′ k ). Sample r 1,i t ∼ R 1,i (· | s t ,
a t , b t ) and compute local target
3) for agents in Team 1, by decentralized optimization algorithms, e.g., by Algorithm 2, if H is a parametric function class H Θ . Update the estimate Q 1,i k+1 for all agents i ∈ N in Team 1. end for Output: The vector of estimates
Theoretical Results
In this section, we provide the main results on the sample complexity of the algorithms proposed in Section 3. We first introduce several common assumptions for both the collaborative and competitive settings.
The function class H used for action-value function approximation greatly influence the performance of the algorithm. Here we use the concept of pseudo-dimension to capture the capacity of function classes, as in the following assumption.
Assumption 4.1 (Capacity of Function Classes).
Let V H + denote the pseudo-dimension of a function class H, i.e., the VC-dimension of the subgraphs of functions in H. Then the function class H used in both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3 has finite pseudo-dimension, i.e., V H + < ∞.
In our fully decentralized setting, each agent may not have access to the simulators for the MDP model transition. Thus, the data D have to be collected from an actual trajectory of the networked M-MDP (or the Markov game), under some joint behavior policy of all agents. Note that the behavior policy of other agents are not required to be known in order to generate such a sample path.
Our assumption regarding the sample path is as follows. 
, and exponentially β-mixing 3 with a rate defined by (β, g, ζ).
Here we assume a mixing property of the random process along the sample path. Informally, this means that the future of the process depends weakly on the past, which allows us to derive tail inequalities for certain empirical processes. Note that Assumption 4.2 is standard in the literature [31, 52] for finite-sample analyses of batch RL using a single trajectory data. We also note that the mixing coefficients do not need to be known when implementing the proposed algorithms.
In addition, we also make the following standard assumption on the concentrability coefficient of the networked M-MDP and the networked zero-sum Markov game, as in [29, 31] . The definitions of concentrability coefficients follow from those in [29, 19] . For completeness, we provide the formal definitions in Appendix §A.
Assumption 4.3 (Concentrability Coefficient). Let ν be the stationary distribution of the samples
where κ MDP and κ MG are concentrability coefficients for the networked M-MDP and zero-sum Markov game as defined in §A, respectively.
The concentrability coefficient measures the similarity between ν 2 and the distribution of the future states of the networked M-MDP (or zero-sum Markov game) when starting from ν 1 . The boundedness of the concentrability coefficient can be interpreted as the controllability of the underlying system, and holds in a great class of regular MDPs and Markov games. See more interpretations on concentrability coefficients in [29, 19] .
As mentioned in §3.1, in practice, at iteration k of Algorithm 1, with a finite number of iterations of the decentralized optimization algorithm, the output Q i k is different from the exact minimizer of (3.1). Such mismatches between the output of the decentralized optimization algorithm and the exact solution to the fitting problem (3.3) also exist in Algorithm 3. Thus, we make the following assumption on this one-step computation error in both cases.
Assumption 4.4 (One-step Decentralized Computation Error)
. At iteration k of Algorithm 1, the computation error from solving (3.1) is uniformly bounded, i.e., there exists certain ǫ i k > 0, such that for any (s, a) ∈ S ×A, it holds that
k are the output of the decentralized optimization algorithm at agent i ∈ N and j ∈ M, respectively.
The computation error, which for example is | Q i k (s, a) − Q k (s, a)| in the collaborative setting, is usually induced from two sources: 1) the error caused by a finite number of iterations of the decentralized optimization algorithm in practice; 2) the error caused by the nonconvexity of (3.2) with nonlinear parametric function class H Θ . The error is always bounded for function class H ⊂ F (S × A, Q max ) with bounded absolute values. Moreover, the error can be further quantified when H Θ is a linear function class, as to be detailed in §4.3.
Fully Decentralized Collaborative MARL
Now we are ready to lay out the main results on the finite-sample error bounds for fully decentralized collaborative MARL. Theorem 4.5 (Finite-sample Bounds for Decentralized Collaborative MARL). Recall that { Q k } 0≤k≤K are the estimator vectors generated from Algorithm 1, and π K = G( Q K ) is the joint average greedy policy with respect to the estimate vector Q K . Let Q π K be the Q-function corresponding to π K , Q * be the optimal Q-function, and R max = (1 + γ )Q max + R max . Also, recall that A = |A|, N = |N |, and T = |D|. Then, under Assumptions 4.1-4.4, for any fixed distribution µ ∈ P (S × A) and δ ∈ (0, 1], there exist constants K 1 and K 2 with
Estimation error
, is a constant that only depends on the distributions µ and ν.
Proof. The proof is mainly based on the following theorem that quantifies the propagation of onestep errors as Algorithm 1 proceeds. 
and ǫ K , C MDP µ,ν , and ǫ are as defined in Theorem 4.5.
Theorem 4.6 shows that both the one-step statistical error and the decentralized computation error will propagate, which constitute the fundamental error that will not vanish even when the iteration K → ∞. See §5.1 for the proof of Theorem 4.6.
To obtain the main results in Theorem 4.5, now it suffices to characterize the one-step statistical error ̺ ν . The following theorem establishes a high probability bound for this statistical error. 
, and define f ′ by
Then, under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2, for δ ∈ (0, 1], T ≥ 1, there exists some Λ T (δ) as defined in Theorem 4.5, such that with probability at least 1 − δ,
The proof of Theorem 4.7 is provided in §5.2. Similar to the existing results in the single-agent setting (e.g., Lemma 10 in [31] ), the one-step statistical error consists of two parts, the approximation error that depends on the richness of the function class H, and the estimation error that vanishes with the number of samples T .
By replacing Q by Q k−1 and f ′ by Q k , the results in Theorem 4.7 can characterize the onestep statistical error T Q k−1 − Q k ν . Together with Theorem 4.6, we conclude the main results in Theorem 4.5.
Theorem 4.5 establishes a high probability bound on the quality of the output policy π K obtained from Algorithm 1 after K iterations. Here we use the µ-weighted norm of the difference between Q * and Q π K as the performance metric. Theorem 4.5 shows that the finite-sample error of decentralized MARL is precisely controlled by three fundamental terms: 1) the approximation error that depends on the richness of the function class H, i.e., how well H preserves the average Bellman operator T ; 2) the estimation error incurred by the fitting step (1), which vanishes with increasing number of samples T ; 3) the computation error in solving the least-squares problem (3.1) in a decentralized way with a finite number of updates. Note that the estimation error, after some simplifications and suppression of constant and logarithmic terms, has the form
Compared with the existing results in the single-agent setting, e.g., [31, Theorem 4] , our results has an additional dependence on O(N log(A)), where N = |N | is the number of agents in the team and A = |A| is cardinality of the joint action set. This dependence on N is due to the fact that the target data used in the fitting step are collections of local target data from N agents; while the dependence on log(A) characterizes the difficulty of estimating Q-functions, each of which has A choices to find the maximum given any state s. Similar terms of order log(A) also shows up in the single-agent setting [30, 31] , which is induced by the capacity of the action space. In addition, a close examination of the proof shows that the effective dimension [31] is (N +1)V H + , which is because we allow N agents to have their own estimates of Q-functions, each of which lies in the function class H with pseudo-dimension V H + . We note that it is possible to sharpen the dependence of the rate and the effective dimension on N via different proof techniques from here, which is left as our future work.
Two-team Competitive MARL
In the sequel, we establish the finite-sample error bounds for the fully decentralized competitive MARL as follows. ) is the joint average equilibrium policy with respect to the estimate vector Q 1 K . Let Q π K be the optimal Q-function corresponding to π K , Q * be the minimax Q-function of the game, and R max = (1 + γ )Q max + R max . Also, recall that A = |A|, B = |B|, N = |N |, and T = |D|. Then, under Assumptions 4.1-4.4, for any fixed distribution µ ∈ P (S × A × B) and δ ∈ (0, 1], there exist constants K 1 and K 2 with 4
Proof. Note that by slightly abusing the notation, the operator T here follows the definition in (2.4). The proof is established mainly upon the following error propagation bound, whose proof is provided in §5.3. 
where we define
and ǫ 1 K , C MG µ,ν , and ǫ 1 are as defined in Theorem 4.8.
Similar to the error propagation results in Theorem 4.6, as iteration K increases, the fundamental error of the Q-function under policy π K is bounded by two terms, the statistical error and the decentralized computation error. The former is characterized by the following theorem. a, b) , and define f ′ as the solution to (4.3). Then, under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2, for δ ∈ (0, 1], T ≥ 1, there exists some Λ T (δ) as defined in Theorem 4.8, such that the bound that has the form of (4.4) holds.
By substituting the results of Theorem 4.10 into Theorem 4.9, we obtain the desired results and conclude the proof.
Theorem 4.8 characterizes the quality of the output policy π K for Team 1 obtained from Algorithm 3 in a high probability sense. We use the same performance metric, i.e., the weighted norm of the difference between Q π K and the minimax action-value Q * , as in the literature [50, 19] . For brevity, we only include the error bound for Team 1 as in [19] , and note that the bound for Team 2 can be obtained immediately by changing the order of the max and min operators and some notations in the proof.
Similar to the results for the collaborative setting, the error bound is composed of three main terms, the inherent approximate error depending on the function class H, the estimation error vanishing with the increasing number of samples, and the decentralized computation error. The simplified estimation error has a nearly identical form as in (4.5), except that the dependence on N log(A) is replaced by N log(AB). Moreover, the effective dimension remains (N + 1)V H + as in (4.5). These observations further substantiate the discussions right after Theorem 4.5, i.e., the dependence on N is due to the local target data distributed at N agents in the team, and the dependence on log(AB) follows from the capacity of the action space. Also note that the number of agents M = |M| in Team 2 does not show up in the bound, thanks to the zero-sum assumption on the rewards.
Using Linear Function Approximation
Now we provide more concrete finite-sample bounds for both settings above when a linear function class for Q-function approximation is used. In particular, we quantify the one-step computation error bound assumed in Assumption 4.4, after L iterations of the decentralized optimization algorithm that solves (3.1) or (3.3) . We first make the following assumption on the features of the linear function class used in both settings. 
being samples from the data set D, then the matrix M MG is full rank.
Since f ∈ H Θ has bounded absolute value Q max , Assumption 4.11 implies that the norm of the features are uniformly bounded. The second assumption on the rank of the matrices M MDP and M MG ensures that the least-squares problems (3.1) and (3.3) are strongly-convex, which enables the DIGing algorithm to achieve the desirable geometric convergence rate over time-varying communication networks. We note that this assumption can be readily satisfied in practice. Let ϕ(s, a) = [ϕ 1 (s, a), · · · , ϕ d (s, a)] ⊤ . Then, the functions {ϕ 1 (s, a), · · · , ϕ d (s, a)} (or vectors of dimension |S |×|A| if the state space S is finite), are required to be linearly independent, in the conventional RL with linear function approximation [58, 59] . Thus, with a rich enough data set D, it is not difficult to find d ≪ T samples from D, such that the matrix [ϕ(s 1 , a 1 ), · · · , ϕ(s d , a d )] ⊤ has full rank, i.e., rank d. In this case, with some algebra (see Lemma B.1 in Appendix §B), one can show that the matrix M MDP is also full-rank. The similar argument applies to the matrix M MG . These arguments justify the rationale behind Assumption 4.11.
Moreover, we make the following assumption on the time-varying consensus matrix C l used in the DIGing algorithm (see also Assumption 1 in [54] ). Assumption 4.12 (Consensus Matrix Sequence {C l }). For any l = 0, 1, · · · , the consensus matrix C l = [c l (i, j)] N ×N satisfies the following relations: 1) (Decentralized property) If i j, and edge (j, i) E l , then c l (i, j) = 0; 2) (Double stochasticity) C l 1 = 1 and 1 ⊤ C l = 1 ⊤ ; 3) (Joint spectrum property) There exists a positive integer B such that
and σ max (·) denotes the largest singular value of a matrix.
Assumption 4.12 is standard and can be satisfied by many matrix sequences used in decentralized optimization. In specific, condition 1) states the restriction on the physical connection of the network; 2) ensures the convergent vector is consensual for all agents; 3) the connectivity of the time-varying graph {G l } l≥0 . See more discussions on this assumption in [54, Section 3] . Now we are ready to present the following corollary on the sample and iteration complexity of Algorithms 1 and 3, when Algorithm 2 and linear function approximation is used.
Corollary 4.13 (Sample and Iteration Complexity with Linear Function Approximation). Suppose
Assumptions 4. 1-4.4, and 4.11-4.12 hold, and Algorithm 2 is used in the fitting steps (3.1) and (3.3) for decentralized optimization. Let π K be the output policy of Algorithm 1, then for any δ ∈ (0, 1], ǫ > 0, and fixed distribution µ ∈ P (S ×A), there exist integers K, T , and L, where K is linear in log(1/ǫ), log[1/(1−γ )], and log(Q max ); T is polynomial in 1/ǫ, γ /(1 − γ ), 1/ R max , log(1/δ), log(β), and N log(A); and L is linear
holds with probability at least 1 − δ. If π K is the output policy of Team 1 from Algorithm 3, the same arguments also hold for any fixed distribution µ ∈ P (S × A × B), but with T being polynomial in N log(AB) instead of N log(A).
Corollary 4.13, whose proof is deferred to §5.5, is established upon Theorems 4.5 and 4.8. It shows that the proposed Algorithms 1 and 3 are efficient with the aid of Algorithm 2 under some mild assumptions, in the sense that finite number of samples and iterations, which scale at most polynomially with the parameters of the problem, are needed to achieve arbitrarily small Q-value errors, provided the inherent approximation error is small.
We note that if the full-rank condition in Assumption 4.11 does not hold, the fitting problems (3.1) and (3.3) are simply convex. Then, over time-varying communication network, it is also possible to establish convergence rate of O(1/l) using the proximal-gradient consensus algorithm [56] . We will skip the detailed discussion on various decentralized optimization algorithms since it is beyond the scope of this paper.
Proofs of the Main Results
In this section, we provide proofs for the main results presented in §4.
Proof of Theorem 4.6
Proof. We start our proof by introducing some notations. For any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, we define
where recall that Q k is the exact minimizer of the least-squares problem (3.1), and Q k = [ Q i k ] i∈N are the output of Q-function estimators at each agent from Algorithm 1, both at iteration k. Also by definition of T in (2.2), the expression T Q k has the form
The term ρ k captures the one-step approximation error of the fitting problem (3.1), which is caused by the finite number of samples used, and the capacity along with the expressive power of the function class H. The term η k captures the computational error of the decentralized optimization algorithm after a finite number of updates. Also, we denote by π k the average greedy policy obtained from the estimator vector Q k , i.e., π k = G( Q k ).
The proof mainly contains the following three steps.
Step (i): First, we establish a recursion between the errors of the exact minimizers of (3.1) at consecutive iterations with respect to the optimal Q-function, i.e., the recursion between Q * − Q k+1 and Q * − Q k . To this end, we first split Q * − Q k+1 as follows by the definitions of ̺ k+1 and η k+1
where we denote by π * the greedy policy with respect to Q * . First note that for any s ′ ∈ S and a ′ ∈ A,
Thus, it follows that T π * Q k ≤ T Q k . Combined with (5.2), we further obtain
Similarly, we can establish a lower bound for Q * − Q k+1 based on Q * − Q k . Note that
where π k is the greedy policy with respect to Q k , i.e., T Q k = T π k Q k . Since Q * = T Q * ≥ T π k Q * , it holds that
By combining (5.3) and (5.4), we obtain that for any k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1},
(5.5) shows that one can both upper and lower bound the error Q * − Q k+1 using terms related to Q * − Q k , plus two error terms η k+1 and ̺ k+1 as defined in (5.1). With the definition of P π in (2.1), we can write (5.5) in a more compact form as
Note that since P π is a linear operator, we can derive the following bounds for multi-step error propagation. 
where ̺ j+1 and η j+1 are defined in (5.1), and we use P π P π ′ and (P π ) k to denote the composition of operators.
Proof. By the linearity of the operator P π , we can obtain the desired results by applying the inequalities in (5.6) multiple times.
The bounds for multi-step error propagation in Lemma 5.1 conclude the first step of our proof.
Step (ii):
Step (i) only establishes the propagation of error Q * − Q k . To evaluate the output of Algorithm 1, we need to further derive the propagation of error Q * − Q π k , where Q π k is the Q-function corresponding to the output joint policy π k from Algorithm 1. The error Q * − Q π k quantifies the sub-optimality of the output policy π k at iteration k. By definition of Q * , we have Q * ≥ Q π k and Q * = T π * Q * . Also note Q π k = T π k Q π k and T Q i k = T π i k Q i k , where we denote the greedy policy with respect to Q i k by π i k , i.e., π i k = π Q i k , for notational convenience. Hence, it follows that
Now we show that the four terms on the right-hand side of (5.7) can be bounded, respectively. First, by definition of π i k , we have
Moreover, since π k = G(Q k ), it holds that for any Q, T π k Q = N −1 i∈N T π i k Q where π i k is the greedy policy with respect to Q i k . Then, by definition of the operator P π , we have
By substituting (5.8) and (5.9) into (5.7), we obtain
This further implies
where I is the identity operator. Note that for any policy π, the operator T π is γ -contractive. Thus the operator I − γ · P π is invertible and it follows that
With the expression (Q * − Q k ) on the right-hand side, we can further bound (5.10) by applying Lemma 5.1. To this end, we first note that for any f 1 , f 2 ∈ F (S × A, Q max ) such that f 1 ≥ f 2 , it holds that P π f 1 ≥ P π f 2 by definition of P π . Thus, for any k < ℓ, we obtain the following upper and lower bounds from Lemma 5.1
Moreover, we denote the second term on the right-hand side of (5.10) by ξ k , i.e.,
Note that ξ k depends on the accuracy of the output of the decentralized optimization algorithm at iteration k, i.e., the error Q i k − Q k , which vanishes with the number of updates of the decentralized optimization algorithm, when the least-squares problem (3.1) is convex. With this definition, together with (5.11) and (5.12) , we obtain the bound for the error Q * − Q π K at the final iteration K as
(5.13)
To simplify the notation, we introduce the coefficients
Also, we introduce K + 1 linear operators {L k } K k=0 that are defined as
· (I − γ P π K ) −1 (P π * ) K−j + (P π K P π K−1 · · · P π j+1 ) , for 0 ≤ j ≤ K − 1,
Then, by taking absolute value on both sides of (5.13), we obtain that for any (s, a) ∈ S × A (5.15) where functions L j |η j+1 + ̺ j+1 | and L K |Q * − Q 0 | are both defined over S × A. The upper bound in (5.15) concludes the second step of the proof.
Step (iii): Now we establish the final step to complete the proof. In particular, we upper bound the weighted norm Q * −Q π K µ for some probability distribution µ ∈ P (S ×A), based on the point-wise bound of |Q * − Q π K | from (5.15). For notational simplicity, we define µ(f ) to be the expectation of f under µ, that is, a)dµ(s, a) . By taking square on both sides of (5.15), we obtain
Then, by applying Jensen's inequality twice, we arrive at
where we also use the fact that K j=0 α j = 1 and for all j = 0, · · · , K, the linear operators L j are positive and satisfy L j 1 = 1. Since both Q * and Q 0 are bounded by
Also, by definition of the concentrability coefficients κ MDP in §A, we have 18) where recall that ν is the distribution over S × A from which the data {(s t , a t )} t=1,··· ,T in trajectory D are sampled. Moreover, we can also bound µ(|ξ K | 2 ) by Jensen's inequality as
By Assumption 4.4, we can further bound the right-hand side of (5.19) as
Therefore, by plugging (5.17), (5.18) , and (5.20) into (5.16), we obtain
Furthermore, from Assumption 4.3 and the definition of φ MDP µ,ν , and letting ǫ K = [N −1 · i∈N (ǫ i K ) 2 ] 1/2 , it follows from (5.21) that
This further yields that
where we denote by η ν = max j=0,···,K−1 η j+1 ν and ̺ ν = max j=0,···,K−1 ̺ j+1 ν . Recall that η j+1 is defined as η j+1 = T Q j − T Q j , which can be further bounded by the one-step decentralized computation error from Assumption 4.4. Specifically, we have the following lemma regarding the difference between T Q j and T Q j .
Lemma 5.2. Under Assumption 4.4, for any j = 0, · · · , K − 1, it holds that η j+1 ν ≤ √ 2γ · ǫ j , where ǫ j = [N −1 · i∈N (ǫ i j ) 2 ] 1/2 and ǫ i j is defined as in Assumption 4.4.
Proof. By definition, we have s, a) .
Now we claim that for any s
In the first case, let a ′ * ∈ argmax a ′ ∈A Q i j (s ′ , a ′ ), then by Assumption 4.4, the values of Q j (s ′ , ·) and Q i j (s ′ , ·) are close at a ′ * up to a small error ǫ i j , i.e.,
for any a ′ including a ′ * . Similarly, one can show that the second case cannot occur. Thus, the claim (5.23) is proved. Letting C 0 = √ 2 − 1, we obtain that
where the second inequality follows Jensen's inequality. Taking expectation over ν, we obtain the desired bound.
From Lemma 5.2, we can further simplify (5.22) to obtain the desired bound in Theorem 4.6, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.7
Proof. The proof integrates the proof ideas in [29] and [31] . First, for any fixed Q = [Q i ] i∈N and f , we define
where r(s, a) = N −1 · i∈N r i (s, a) with r i (s, a) ∼ R i (s, a). We also define L H = {ℓ f ,Q : f ∈ H, Q ∈ H N }.
For convenience, we denote d t (Q) = d(Q)(s t , a t , s t+1 ), for any data (s t , a t , s t+1 ) drawn from D. Then, we define L T (f ; Q) and L(f ; Q) as
, and argmin f ∈H L T (f ; Q) is exactly the minimizer of the fitting objective defined in (4.3). Also, note that the second term on the right-hand side of (5.24) does not depend on f , thus
where we use the definition of f ′ and ℓ f ,Q , and let Z t = (s t , {a i t } i∈N , s t+1 ) for notational convenience. In addition, we define two constants C 1 and C 2 as
and C 2 = 1/(2048 · R 4 max ), and also define Λ T (δ) and ǫ as
where V = (N + 1)V H + and log + (x) = max{log(x), 0}. Let
Then, from (5.52), it suffices to show P 0 < δ in order to conclude the proof. To this end, we use the same technique in [31] that splits the T samples in D into 2m T blocks that come in pairs, with each block having k T samples, i.e., T = 2m T k T . Then, we can introduce the "ghost" samples that have m T blocks, H 1 , · · · , H 2 , · · · , H m T , where each block has the same marginal distribution as the every second blocks in D, but these new m T blocks are independent of one another. We let H = m T i=1 H i . Recall that R max = (1 + γ )Q max + R max , then for any f ∈ H and Q ∈ H N , ℓ f ,Q has absolute value bounded by R 2 max . Thus, we can apply an extended version of Pollard's tail inequality to β-mixing sequences (Lemma 5 in [31] ), to obtain that P sup
where {β m } denote the mixing coefficients of the sequence Z 1 , · · · , Z T in D, and N 1 (ǫ/16, L H , (Z ′ t ; t ∈ H)) is the empirical covering number (see the formal definition in §A) of the function class L H evaluated on the ghost samples (Z ′ t ; t ∈ H). To bound the empirical covering number N 1 (ǫ/16, L H , (Z ′ t ; t ∈ H)), we establish the following technical lemma.
Recall that R max = (1 + γ )Q max + R max , and A = |A| is the cardinality of the joint action set. Then, under Assumption 4.1, it holds that
Proof. For any l f ,Q and l f , Q in L H , the empirical ℓ 1 -distance between them can be bounded as
and y Z = (s 2 , · · · , s T +1 ), then the first term in the bracket of (5.30) is the D Z -based ℓ 1 -distance of functions in H, while the second term is the y Z -based ℓ 1distance of functions in the set H ∨ N = {V : V (·) = N −1 · i∈N max a ′ ∈A Q i (·, a ′ ) and Q ∈ H N } (times γ ). This implies that
The first empirical covering number N 1 (ǫ, H ∨ N , y Z ) can be further bounded by the following lemma, whose proof is deferred to §B. Lemma 5.4. For any fixed y Z = (y 1 , · · · , y T ), let D y = {(y t , a j )} t∈[T ],j∈ [A] , where recall that A = |A| and A = {a 1 , · · · , a A }. Then, under Assumption 4.1, it holds that
In addition, the second empirical covering number N 1 (ǫ, H, D Z ) in (5.31) can be bounded directly by Corollary 3 in [60] (see also Proposition B.2 in §B). Combined with the bound from Lemma 5.4, we finally obtain
Replacing 2 R max (1 + γ )ǫ by ǫ in (5.32), we arrive at the desired bound and complete the proof.
By Lemma 5.3, we can bound N 1 (ǫ/16, L H , (Z ′ t ; t ∈ H)) in (5.29) as
where V = (N + 1)V H + and C 1 = C 1 (V H + , Q max , R max , γ ) is as defined in (5.26 ). Now we are ready to bound the probability P 0 in (5.29), based on the following technical lemma. ⌉, m T = T /(2K T ), δ ∈ (0, 1], V ≥ 2, and C 1 , C 2 , β, g, ζ > 0. Recall that the parameters (β, g, ζ) define the rate of the exponential β-mixing sequence Z 1 , · · · , Z T in D. Further, ǫ and Λ T are as defined in (5.27), then
In particular, let C 2 = [8(16 R 2 max ) 2 ] −1 = (2048 R 4 max ) −1 , we obtain that P 0 < δ by applying Lemma 5.5 onto the right-hand side of (5.29). Note that Λ T = V /2 log(T ) + log(e/δ) + max log(C 1 ) + V /2 log(C 2 ), log(β), 0
are some constants that depend on the parameters in the brackets. This yields the desired bound and completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.9
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.6. For brevity, we will only emphasize the the difference between them. We first define two quantities ̺ 1 k and η 1 k as follows 33) where recall that at iteration k, Q 1 k is the exact minimizer of the least-squares problem (3.
3) among f 1 ∈ F 1 , and Q 1 k = [ Q 1,i k ] i∈N are the output of Q-function estimators at all agents in Team 1 from Algorithm 3. Recall from (2.4) that T Q 1 k here has the form
The term ρ 1 k captures the approximation error of the first fitting problem in (3.3) , which can be characterized using tools from nonparametric regression. The term η 1 k , on the other hand, captures the computational error of the decentralized optimization algorithm after a finite number of updates. Also, we denote by π k the average equilibrium policy obtained from the estimator vector Q 1 k , i.e., π k = E 1 ( Q k ). For notational convenience, we also introduce the following notations for several different minimizer policies, σ i k , σ i, * k , σ k , σ * k , σ * k , σ i k , and σ k , which satisfy
We also separate the proof into three main steps, similar to the procedure in the proof of Theorem 4.6.
Step (i): The first step is to establish a recursion between the errors of the exact minimizers of the least-squares problem (3.3) with respect to Q * , the minimax Q-function of the game. The error Q * − Q 1 k+1 can be written as
where we denote by π * the equilibrium policy with respect to Q * . Then, by definition of T π * and T in zero-sum Markov games, we have T π * Q 1 k ≤ T Q 1 k . Also, from (5.34 ) and by relation between T π,σ and P π,σ for any (π, σ), it holds that
Thus, (5.35) can be upper bounded by
Moreover, we can also establish a lower bound for Q * − Q 1 k+1 . Note that
where π k is the max min policy with respect to Q 1 k . Since Q * = T Q * ≥ T π k Q * and T π k Q * − T π k Q 1 k = T π k , σ * k Q * − T π k , σ k Q 1 k ≥ T π k , σ * k Q * − T π k , σ * k Q 1 k , it follows that
Thus, from the notations in (5.34), combining (5.36) and (5.37) yields
from which we obtain the following multi-step error propagation bounds and conclude the first step of our proof. 
where ̺ 1 j+1 and η 1 j+1 are defined in (5.33) , and we use P π,σ P π ′ ,σ ′ to denote the composition of operators.
Proof. By the linearity of the operator P π,σ , we can obtain the desired results by applying the inequalities in (5.38) multiple times.
Step (ii): Now we quantify the sub-optimality of the output policy at iteration k of Algorithm 3 for Team 1, i.e., the error Q * −Q π k . Note that Q π k here represents the action-value when the maximizer Team 1 plays π k and the minimizer Team 2 plays the optimal counter-policy against π k . As argued in [19] , this is a natural measure of the quality of the policy π k . The error Q * − Q π k can be separated as
Now we bound the four terms on the right-hand side of (5.39) as follows. First, by definition of π i k , we have
Moreover, since π k = E 1 (Q k ), by definition, T π k Q = N −1 i∈N T π i k Q for any Q, where π i k is the equilibrium policy of Team 1 with respect to Q i k . Thus, we have from (5.34) that
where the inequalities follow from the fact that T π * Q * ≤ T π * ,σ Q * , T π i k Q 1,i k ≤ T π i k ,σ Q 1,i k , and T π k Q 1 k ≤ T π k ,σ Q 1 k for any σ ∈ P (B). By substituting (5.40), (5.41) , and (5.42) into (5.39) , we obtain
Since I − γ · P π k ,σ k is invertible, we further obtain
Moreover, by setting ℓ = K and k = 0 in Lemma 5.6, we obtain that for any i ∈ N γ · (P π * ,σ i, * K − P π K ,σ K )(Q * − Q 1 K ) ≤ K−1 j=0 γ K−j · (P π * ,σ i, * K P π * ,σ * K−1 · · · P π * ,σ * j+1 ) − (P π K ,σ K P π K−1 , σ * K−1 · · · P π j+1 , σ * j+1 )
Moreover, we denote the second term on the right-hand side of (5.43) by ξ 1 k , i.e.,
which depends on the quality of the solution to (3.1) returned by the decentralized optimization algorithm. By combining (5.44) and (5.45) , we obtain the bound of (5.43) at the final iteration K as
For simplicity, we define the coefficients {α j } K k=0 as in (5.14) , and K + 1 linear operators
Then, we take absolute value on both sides of (5.46) to obtain
for any (s, a, b) ∈ S × A × B. This completes the second step of the proof.
Step (iii): We note that (5.47) has almost the identical form as (5.15) , with the fact that K j=0 α j = 1 and for all j = 0, · · · , K, the linear operators L 1 j are positive and satisfy L 1 j 1 = 1. Hence, the proof here follows directly from the Step (iii) in §5.1, from which we obtain that for any fixed µ ∈ P (S × A × B) Proof. Note that 49) for any constant
Now we claim that for any s
In the first case, let (π ′ * , σ ′ * ) be the minimax strategy pair for g i j (π ′ , σ ′ ), such that g i j (π ′ * , σ ′ * ) = max π ′ ∈P (A) min σ ′ ∈P (B) g j (π Note that σ ′ * = σ ′ * (π ′ * ) ∈ argmin σ ′ ∈P (B) g j (π ′ * , σ ′ ) is a function of π ′ * . By Assumption 4.4, Q 1 j (s ′ , ·, ·) and Q 1,i j (s ′ , ·, ·) are close to each other uniformly over A × B. Thus, by the linearity of g j and g i j , we have g j (π ′ * , σ ′ * ) ≥ g i j (π ′ * , σ ′ * ) − ǫ 1,i j . Together with (5.50), we obtain
However, (5.51) cannot hold with any C 1 > 1 since max π ′ ∈P (A) min σ ′ ∈P (B) g i j (π ′ , σ ′ ) should be no smaller than g j (π, σ) with any (π, σ) pair that satisfies σ = σ(π) ∈ argmin σ∈P (B) g j (π, σ), including g j (π ′ * , σ ′ * ). Similarly, one can show that the second case cannot occur. Thus, the claim (5.49) is proved. Letting C 1 = √ 2, we obtain that
where H ∨ N here is defined as
We further bound the first covering number N 1 (ǫ, H ∨ N , y Z ) by the following lemma, which is proved later in §B. Lemma 5.9. For any fixed y Z = (y 1 , · · · , y T ), let D y = {(y t , a j , b k )} t∈[T ],j∈[A],k∈ [B] , where recall that A = |A|, B = |B|, and A = {a 1 , · · · , a A }, B = {b 1 , · · · , b B }. Then, under Assumption 4.1, it holds that
Furthermore, we can bound N 1 (ǫ, H, D Z ) by Proposition B.2, which together with Lemma 5.9 yields a bound for (5.54)
which completes the proof by replacing 2 R max (1 + γ )ǫ by ǫ.
By choosing C 1 as
and applying Lemma 5.8, we bound N 1 (ǫ/16, L H , (Z ′ t ; t ∈ H)) as
where V = (N + 1)V H + . Further, choosing C 2 = 1/(2048 · R 4 max ), we obtain P 0 < δ by Lemma 5.5. In particular, Λ T can be written as Λ T = K 1 + K 2 · N , with
being some constants that depend on the parameters in the brackets. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 4.13
Proof. The proof proceeds by controlling the three error terms in the bound (except the inherent approximation error) in Theorems 4.5 and 4.8 by ǫ/3 for any ǫ > 0. In particular, to show the first argument for the collaborative setting, let
we immediately obtain that K is linear in log(1/ǫ), log[1/(1 − γ )], and log(Q max ). Let the estimation error be controlled by ǫ/3, we have
By definition of Λ T in Theorem 4.5, we obtain that T is polynomial in 1/ǫ, γ /(1−γ ), 1/ R max , log(1/δ), log(β), and N log(A). As for the decentralized computation error, let
Note that under Assumptions 4.11 and 4.12, we can apply Lemma B.3, which shows that there exist constants λ ∈ [0, 1) and C 0 > 0, such that at each iteration k of Algorithm 1
where θ * k corresponds to the exact solution to (3.1) at this iteration k, i.e., Q k = (θ * k ) ⊤ ϕ, and θ i k,l represents the estimate of θ * k of agent i at iteration l of Algorithm 2. Thus, if Algorithm 2 terminates after L iterations, we have Q i k = (θ i k,L ) ⊤ ϕ, where recall that Q i k denotes the output of the decentralized optimization step in Algorithm 1. Since the features ϕ are uniformly bounded, we obtain from (5.56) that there exists a constant C 1 > 0, such that for any (s, a) ∈ S × A
Thus, we can choose C 1 C 0 / √ N · λ L to bound the decentralized optimization ǫ k . These arguments apply to all iteration k ∈ [K], which means that we can bound both ǫ = max 0≤k≤K−1 and ǫ K in (5.55) by C 2 · λ L for some constant C 2 . Therefore, we conclude from (5.55) that the number of iterations L is linear in log(1/ǫ), log[γ /(1 − γ )]. The arguments above also hold for the terms of the bound in Theorem 4.8, except that for T , the dependence on N log(A) changes to N log(AB). This completes the proof.
Conclusions
In this paper, we provided finite-sample analyses for fully decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning. Specifically, we considered both the collaborative and competitive MARL settings. In the collaborative setting, a team of heterogeneous agents connected by a time-varying communication network aim to maximize the globally averaged return of all agents, with no existence of any central controller. In the competitive setting, two teams of such fully decentralized RL agents form a zero-sum Markov game. Our settings cover several convetional MARL settings as special cases, e.g., the conventional collaborative MARL with a common reward function for all agents, and the competitive MARL that is usually modeled as a two-player zero-sum Markov game.
In both settings, we proposed fitted-Q iteration-based MARL algorithms, with the aid of decentralized optimization algorithms to solve the fitting problem at each iteration. We quantified the performance bound of the output action-value, using finite number of samples drawn from a single RL trajectory. In addition, with linear function approximation, we further derived the performance bound after finite number of iterations of decentralized computation. To our knowledge, these are the first finite-sample analyses for multi-agent RL, in either the collaborative or the competitive setting. We believe these theoretical results provide some insights into the fundamental performance of MARL algorithms implemented with finite samples and finite computation iterations in practice. One interesting future direction is to extend the finite-sample analyses to more general MARL settings, e.g., general-sum Markov games. It is also promising to sharpen the bounds we obtained, in order to better understand and improve both the sample and computation efficiency of MARL algorithms.
A Definitions
In this section, we provide the detailed definitions of some terms used in the main text for the sake of completeness.
We first give the definition of β-mixing of a stochastic process mentioned in Assumption 4.2.
Definition A.1 (β-mixing). Let {Z t } t=1,2,··· be a stochastic process, and denote the collection of (Z 1 , · · · , Z t ) by Z 1:t . Let σ(Z i:j ) denote the σ-algebra generated by Z i:j . The m-th β-mixing coefficient of {Z t }, denoted by β m , is defined as
Then, {Z t } is said to be β-mixing if β m → 0 as m → ∞. In particular, we say that a β-mixing process mixes at an exponential rate with parameters β, g, ζ > 0 if β m ≤ β · exp(−gm ζ ) holds for all m ≥ 0.
We then provide formal definitions of concentrability coefficients as in [29, 19] , for networked multi-agent MDPs and team zero-sum Markov games, respectively, used in Assumption 4.3.
Definition A.2 (Concentrability Coefficient for Networked Multi-agent MDPs). Let ν 1 , ν 2 ∈ P (S ×A) be two probability measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on S ×A. Let {π t } be a sequence of joint policies for all the agents in the networked multi-agent MDP, with π t : S → P (A) for all t. Suppose the initial state-action pair (s 0 , a 0 ) has distribution ν 1 , and the action a t is sampled from the joint policy π t . For any integer m, we denote by P π m P π m−1 · · · P π 1 ν 1 the distribution of (s m , a m ) under the policy sequence {π t } t=1,···,m . Then, the m-th concentration coefficient is defined as κ MDP (m; ν 1 , ν 2 ) = sup π 1 ,...,π m E ν 2 d(P π m P π m−1 · · · P π 1 ν 1 ) dν 2 2 1/2 , where d(P π m P π m−1 · · · P π 1 ν 1 )/dν 2 is the Radon-Nikodym derivation of P π m P π m−1 · · · P π 1 ν 1 with respect to ν 2 , and the supremum is taken over all possible joint policy sequences {π t } t=1,··· ,m . Definition A.3 (Concentrability Coefficient for Networked Zero-sum Markov Games). Let ν 1 , ν 2 ∈ P (S ×A×B) be two probability measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on S ×A×B. Let {(π t , σ t )} be a sequence of joint policies for all the agents in the networked zero-sum Markov game, with π t : S → P (A) and σ t : S → P (B) for all t. Suppose the initial state-action pair (s 0 , a 0 , b 0 ) has distribution ν 1 , and the action a t and b t are sampled from the joint policy π t and σ t , respectively. For any integer m, we denote by P π m ,σ m P π m−1 ,σ m−1 · · · P π 1 ,σ 1 ν 1 the distribution of (s m , a m , b m ) under the policy sequence {(π t , σ t )} t=1,···,m . Then, the m-th concentration coefficient is defined as κ MG (m; ν 1 , ν 2 ) = sup π 1 ,σ 1 ,...,π m ,σ m E ν 2 d(P π m ,σ m P π m−1 ,σ m−1 · · · P π 1 ,σ 1 ν 1 ) dν 2 2 1/2 , where d(P π m ,σ m P π m−1 ,σ m−1 · · · P π 1 ,σ 1 ν 1 )/dν 2 is the Radon-Nikodym derivation of P π m ,σ m P π m−1 ,σ m−1 · · · P π 1 ,σ 1 ν 1 with respect to ν 2 , and the supremum is taken over all possible joint policy sequences {(π t , σ t )} t=1,··· ,m .
where for each i ∈ [N ], f i : R p → R is differentiable, µ i -strongly convex, and has L i -Lipschitz continuous gradients. Suppose Assumption 4.12 on the consensus matrix C holds, recall that δ, B are the parameters in the assumption, then there exists a constant λ = λ(χ, B, N , L, µ) ∈ [0, 1), where µ = N −1 · N i=1 µ i and L = max i∈[N ] L i , such that the sequence of matrices {[x 1 l , · · · , x N l ] ⊤ } generated by DIGing algorithm along iterations l = 0, 1, · · · , converges to the matrix x * = 1(x * ) ⊤ , where x * is the unique solution to (B.1), at a geometric rate O(λ l ).
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.4
Proof. First consider N = 1, i.e., Q = Q 1 ∈ H. Let {Q j } l∈[N 1 (ǫ ′ ,H,D y )] be the ǫ ′ -covering of H(D y ) for some ǫ ′ > 0. Recall that A = {a 1 , · · · , a A }. Now we show that {max a∈A Q l (·, a)} l∈[N 1 (ǫ ′ ,H,D y )] is a covering of H ∨ 1 . Since for any Q 1 , there exists an l ′ ∈ [N 1 (ǫ ′ , H, D y )] such that
Let ǫ ′ = ǫ/A and a Q t ∈ argmax a∈A |Q 1 (y t , a) − Q l ′ (y t , a)|, we have 
